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  According  to current  analytic metaphysics,  the  truthmaker  is  that which makes 




2. Even  if  it were based on a  theory of  truth,  truthmaker  theory cannot simultaneously 
remain consistent with its central notation “truth is grounded in  reality”, and appropriately 
address negative existentials and synthetic truths.




this common misconception about  truthmaker  theory by underscoring  the  relationship 
between truthmaker theory and a theory of  truth. When it becomes clear  that  truthmaker 
theory presupposes  a  theory of  truth,  questions  about what  kind of  theory of  truth 
truthmaker theorists accept, logically follow. In response to such questions, I will consider 
three classic theories of truth (correspondence, coherence, pragmatism) and one new theory 
(alethic pluralism). Given that each theory of truth is inevitably flawed, I will conclude that 
we are unable to solve all  the problems. However, if  truthmaker theorists decide to reject 
aforementioned central notation, this theory would benefit from adopting alethic pluralism 
in its stead because the many to many relationship between truthbearers and truthmakers 
can be maintained only on the basis of alethic pluralism. This line of thought is completely 
consistent with semantics. Thus, alethic pluralism is the best option for truthmaker theory.
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